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The matter before
the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants The Way
International, Inc., Loy "Craig" Martindale, Rosalie F.
Rivenbark, John R. Reynolds, Donald E. Wierwille, Howard R. Allen, and
Ramona Bidon. Also before the Court is the Brief in Opposition of
Plaintiffs, Mrs. Allen and Mr. Allen and Defendants' Brief in Reply .
Defendants argue, pursuant to Rule 56(C) of the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs argue that there
are genuine issues of fact, and this case should go to the jury.
The Way is a church
and biblical research, teaching, and fellowship ministry. It is also a
Section 501(c)(3) not for profit corporation, with its principle place of
business in Shelby County, Ohio. The Way is governed by a three person
board of trustees who retain all decision making authority. The structure
of the Way is hierarchical and includes state, regional, and local
fellowship coordinators. The current trustees are Rosalie F. Rivenbark
and John Reynolds, defendants in this action, and Harve Platig. Rivenbark
affidavit, ¶ 2. Former trustees include Craig Martindale, Howard Allen,
and Don Wierwille, who are also defendants. The final defendant is Ramona
Bidon, who is alleged to have facilitated the sexual relationship between
Martindale and Mrs. Allen.
Complaint, ¶ 11.
Dr. Victor Paul
Wierwille established The Way in 1942. The goal of The Way is to return
its practice of Christianity to its first century roots. The Way teaches
its followers to live a lifestyle of the early Christians, spending time
together in fellowship and sharing their abundance with the church.
Rivenbark affidavit, ¶ 4, 6, 7. The focus of the ministry is on local
fellowships. At Way fellowships, which typically take place in homes,
believers share their lives, insights, and experiences. These activities
are supervised by the home fellowship coordinator. Id. at ¶ 4. These coordinators
typically have been trained in The Way Corps. Id. at ¶ 8.
The Way maintains
two facilities where staff reside and training takes place, its New
Knoxville headquarters and The Way Household Ranch in Colorado. Every person on staff has a
responsibility to the community in addition to his or her job. One person
may serve as a maintenance worker, and another person may serve as a food
service worker. Compensation of staff is set on a "need" basis.
Id. at.
¶ 6, 10, 11.
Plaintiffs, The
Allens first became followers of The Way in 1978 and 1981, respectively.
Plaintiffs were married in 1985 and are currently husband and wife. In
1994, both The Allens applied for and were accepted into Way Corps
training. Mrs. Allen deposition, pages 68-71, 84-85. The Way Corps
program involves three to four years of intensive spiritual, mental, and
physical study and discipline. Rivenbark affidavit, ¶ 8. Portions of the
training take place at The Way Household Ranch in Gunnison, Colorado.
Id. The
physical component of the training is designed to demonstrate to the
trainees their ability to conquer fears and perform feats they may never
have had the opportunity to try. The program includes hiking, jogging,
rock climbing/rappelling, and the like. Edwin Homey, affidavit, ¶ 5.
There is a tuition fee which trainees must pay, but it is a fraction of
the cost actually involved in the program. Other Way followers assist
trainees with their expenses, along with The Way itself -Rivenbark
affidavit, ¶ 9.
Between August,
1996 and May, 1997, Mrs. Allen and Craig Martindale (Edited out some
details for the victim's protection) . Mrs. Allen deposition, pages 189,
220- 227, 233-234, 247.
Plaintiffs'
complaint consists of six counts. In Count One, plaintiffs allege that
The Way breached its contract with plaintiffs by creating impossible
working conditions, including requiring plaintiffs to submit to sexual
assault as a condition of continued employment. In Count Two, plaintiffs
allege that Mrs. Allen was sexually victimized by defendants Martindale,
Bidon and others. Plaintiff; allege that Mrs. Allen was incapable of
consenting to such sexual activities. Plaintiffs Further allege that The
Way leadership attempted to conceal this behavior. Plaintiffs allege that
they suffered emotional distress as a result. In Count Three, plaintiffs
allege that The Way had a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs and
that The Way misused that relationship. In Count Four, plaintiffs allege
that The Way defamed them, by designating them as "mark and
avoid". In Count Five, plaintiffs allege that the assault upon Mrs.
Allen occurred as a result of a civil conspiracy. In Count Six,
plaintiffs allege that The Way engaged in a -pattern of corrupt activity,
which included acts of assault and rape.
Defendants argue
that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, because they ask this Court to regulate how The Way
practices its beliefs or how it conducts religious instruction and
training for its ministers. It is true that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution prohibit Civil Courts from
making any inquiry into religious doctrine, practice, or policy, or
purely ecclesiastical or spiritual disputes of a church or a religious
organization. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church. 393 U. S.
440, 449, 451 (1969). It is also true that beliefs or practices that are
religious in motivation are protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. Strock v. Pressnell 30 Ohio St. 3d 207, 210 (1988).
Churches are similarly free to decide, without state interference,
matters of church government and discipline as well as those of faith and
doctrine. Tibbs v. Kendrick, 93 Ohio
App. 3d 3 5, 42 (8th Dist. 1994). Courts cannot inquire into the
subjective judgments of religious officers and bodies when they relate to
the churches' internal ecclesiastical workings and disciplines. Hutchison
v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 3 92, 393 (6th Cir. 1986).
However, even
though the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution prohibit Civil Courts from unwarranted intrusion into religious
doctrine, policy, or purely ecclesiastical or spiritual disputes of a
church or a religious organization, there is no constitutional protection
for actions which, even when clothed in a religious mantle, violate basic
premises of our society. Swann v. Pa , 527 S.W. 2d 99 (Tenn. 1975). The right to believe is
absolute. The right to act is subject to reasonable regulation designed
to protect a compelling state interest. Id. The United States Supreme Court
has specifically held that while laws cannot interfere with mere
religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices. Reynolds v. .1
IS, 98 U. S.
145 (1878). The Court finds that an important distinction exists between
belief and conduct. The beliefs espoused by The Way, and its members, are
not subject to review by this Court. The conduct of The Way, and its
members, is subject to reasonable regulation designed to protect a
compelling state interest. The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution cannot be used to protect The Way, or its
members, against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the
peace, good order and morals of society. Davis v, Beasor 133 U.S. 333, 342
(1980). Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that sexual
misconduct by clergy is not protected by any claim of First Amendment
privilege. Strock v. Pres 38 Ohio
St.3d (1988). Similarly, a religious organization can be held liable for
failing to protect its members from the sexual assaults of its employees.
Byrd v Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56 (1991). The Court finds that Craig
Martindale's sexual encounters with Mrs. Allen must be considered as
conduct, rather than beliefs. The issue is whether or not the sexual
relationship was consensual. The state has a compelling interest in
preserving the peace, and that includes the prevention of sexual
assaults. Counts one and two of plaintiffs complaint are predicated upon
plaintiffs' allegation that Mrs. Allen was sexually assaulted by Craig
Martindale, a trustee and leader of The Way at the time. The issue of
whether or not the sexual relations between Mr. Martindale and Ms. Allen
was consensual, is a question of fact, which must be left to the jury.
In Count Five,
plaintiffs allege that defendants acted in concert to achieve an unlawful
purpose, and as a result of defendants' conspiracy, plaintiffs have been
assaulted. There is evidence that Rosalie Rivenbark knew about Craig
Martindale's extra marital sexual relationships, as early as 1995.
Deposition of L. Craig Martindale, page 123. Accordingly, a jury must
decide not only if Mrs. Allen has been sexually assaulted, but also
whether or not a conspiracy existed among the defendants, which enabled
the alleged assault to occur. -
Similarly, in Count
Six, plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in a pattern of corrupt
activity, which included acts. of assault and rape. There is evidence to
indicate that both Rosalie Rivenbark and Ramona Bidon played a role in
the events leading up to the sexual encounter between Craig Martindale
and Mrs. Allen. A jury must decide whether the encounter was consensual,
or if an assault occurred. If the jury finds that an assault occurred,
the same jury might reasonably conclude that defendants engaged in a
pattern of corrupt activity, which led to the assault.
Count three alleges
that defendants misused their fiduciary relationship with plaintiff to
defraud plaintiffs of money and other things of value. The Court finds
that it cannot adjudicate this claim, because to do so would require the
Court to examine and evaluate The Way's religious doctrines and beliefs.
Courts cannot inquire into the subjective judgments of religious officers
and bodies when they relate to the internal workings of the church.
Hutchison v. Thomas, 789F.2d392 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, summary
judgment is hereby granted in favor of defendants upon count three of
plaintiffs' complaint.
As to Count Four of
plaintiffs' complaint, "mark and avoid" is a doctrine derived
from multiple biblical sources. It is most concisely set forth in the
Apostle Paul's Epistle to the Romans 16:17, stating that those who cause
divisions contrary to the doctrine should be "marked and
avoided". The Way applies this designation to those that it deems
fall within Paul's directive. Rivenbark affidavit, ~ 12. Churches are
free to decide, without state interference, matters of church government
and discipline, as well as those of faith and doctrine. Tibbs v. Kendrick
93 Ohio
App: 3 d 3 5 (8th Dist. 1994). The Court finds that the words "mark
and avoid" would mean little to an individual who had no connection
with The Way. This designation is an internal form of church discipline,
and as such, this Court has no authority to regulate the use of that
designation. Accordingly, defendants are hereby granted summary judgment
as to count four of plaintiffs' complaint.
Defendants argue
that the one year statute of limitations for assault and battery bars all
of plaintiffs' claims predicated on allegedly coerced sexual activity. It
is true that the nature or subject matter of the case, rather than the
form in which the action is pleaded, governs when determining the
applicable statute of limitations. Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179,
183 (1984). The Court agrees with defendants' assertion that the main
thrust of plaintiffs' complaint is that Craig Martindale, a respected
leader of the way, engaged in a pattern of sexual battery against her.
Defendants cite the decision of the Third District Court of Appeals in
Bishop v. Miller, Nos. 4-97- (1991, 1998), Ohio App. LEXIS 1526 (Third
Dist. March 26, 1998). In Bishop, the Third District Court of Appeals
upheld the entry of summary judgment against plaintiffs who brought a
variety of claims against their pastor based upon alleged sexual battery.
The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the four year
statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress
applied to their claims, rather than the one year statute of limitations
for assault and battery. The Court looked to the actual nature or subject
matter of the case, and dismissed the plaintiffs, arguments regarding
intentional infliction of emotional distress, because sexual battery was
the basis for the claim. The Court found that plaintiffs' claims were not
timely filed, and therefore plaintiffs' claims were time barred under the
one year statute of limitations for assault and battery.
The Court agrees
with defendants' argument that the one year statute of limitations
applies. The Court disagrees with defendants' argument that plaintiffs'
claims are not timely filed. Defendants argue that the last sexual
encounter between Craig Martindale and Mrs. Allen took place in May,
1997. If no evidence existed of any sexual encounter between Craig
Martindale and Mrs. Allen after May, 1997, defendants would be correct in
asserting that plaintiffs' complaint, filed April 3, 2000, was untimely.
However, Mrs. Allen served as Rosalie Rivenbark's secretary, from August
or September of 1997, until March of 1999. During that time period, Craig
Martindale would approach Frances
(Edited out for victim's protection). Mrs. Allen deposition, page 189.
There is evidence to indicate that the last incident took place in March
of 1999. Defendants argue that the incidents between May, 1997 and March,
1999 cannot be considered, because they were not specifically pled in
plaintiffs' complaint. The Court disagrees. Count One of plaintiffs'
complaint simply refers to sexual assault during plaintiff s employment
and plaintiff was employed by The Way until March, 1999. The remaining counts
in plaintiffs' complaint incorporate Count One. This means that
plaintiffs' complaint should have been filed by March, 2000. However, as
indicated by Exhibit F, attached to plaintiffs' brief in opposition to
defendants' motion for summary judgment, defendants' counsel signed a
tolling agreement, extending the expiration of any applicable statute of
limitations that expired on or before March 13, 2000, through and
including April 14, 2000. Plaintiffs' complaint was filed April 3, 2000.
Plaintiffs' complaint was filed within the applicable one year statute of
limitations, as extended by the tolling agreement.
Accordingly, the
Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
defendants are entitled to summary judgment, as a matter of law, in
regards to Counts Three and Four of plaintiffs' complaint.
Defendants' motion
for summary judgment is DENIED, as it relates to Counts One, Two, Five
and Six of plaintiffs' complaint. This matter shall proceed as scheduled
on Counts One, Two, Five, and Six of plaintiffs' complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED
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SIGNED
John D. Schmitt
Judge
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