Studying knowledge

[year2027]

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reading a old book at

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INTRODUCTION

PHILOSOPHY aims at a rational and systematic compre

hension of reality. Or, since experience is the fundamental

fact in all theorizing, and since reality can be known only

in experience, in the largest sense of that word, we may

say that philosophy aims at a rational and systematic com

prehension and interpretation of experience.

This aim, however, is only an ideal which is very im

perfectly realized. Philosophy is militant, not triumphant.

As it has required the labor of many generations to bring

the system of thought to its present development, so it will

require the labor of many more to bring that system to

anything like completion. Meanwhile only general outlines

and partial views are possible. These, however, may be

valuable, if they begin with admitted facts and make good

their claims as they go along.

Philosophic theories fall into two great classes, theories

of knowing and theories of being. This results from the

nature of the case. The theory of being is the ultimate

aim of philosophy, but that theory cannot be completed

without a theory of knowing. A philosophic system is

determined and characterized by its position on these two

points.

In the doctrine of knowledge, the fundamental division

of theories turns upon their conception of the mind as active

or passive in knowing. However complicated the theories

may seem in their application, the essential question is this,

Is the mind active or passive in knowledge? Perhaps we

may think that the term mind smacks too much of meta

physics, and then the question takes another form, Is

knowing an active process determined by laws within

thought itself, or is it only a mechanical reflection of objects

in a passive consciousness? The answer to this question

gives direction to our philosophy ; and a long train of

speculative consequences depends upon it.

In the doctrine of being, the deepest distinction of

theories turns upon the conception of fundamental being,

whether it be conceived as mechanical and unintelligent,

or as purposive and intelligent. Unwittingly, often, but

none the less really, philosophic debate revolves around the

antitheses of freedom and necessity, of purpose and mechan

ism, of intelligence and non-intelligence. In addition, as

already suggested, the theories of knowing and of being

mutually affect one another.

There are, then, certain typical theories of knowing and

of being, each of which has its peculiar implications ; and

whoever would understand the problems and the history of

philosophy must master these typical theories. When this

is done, particular systems may be understood in their essen

tial w^orth, or worthlessness, as soon as we get their relation

to the typical theory. "When we know the logic of the gen

eral view we need not waste time in studying its particular

forms. If they are logical we know where they must come

out. If they are not logical we have no system but disjointed

observations. They are systems only in the catalogue or

advertisement.

Hence, epistemology, or the doctrine of knowledge, andmetaphysics, or the doctrine of real existence, are the two

grand divisions of philosophy. As already pointed out,

these do not admit of any absolute separation, as if the the

ory of one could be completed without a theory of the other.

They are, then, different aspects of the whole question rather

than mutually independent factors. At the same time, they

are sufficiently distinct to make it desirable to treat them

separately.

Historically, systems of philosophy have commonly em

phasized one or the other of these two questions so as to be

come predominantly either theories of knowing or theories

of being. Thus the systems of Locke, Hume, and Kant are

pre-eminently theories of knowing. The systems of Spinoza

and Leibnitz" are fundamentally theories of being. In the

historical development of thought, theories of being come

first. This is due to the fact that the mind is objective in

its first activities, and becomes reflective only at a later date.

Knowledge is really determined both by the subject and by

the object ; but the object is the only determinant for unre-

flective thought. The full significance of the subject for

knowledge was first proclaimed by Kant. Thought first

goes straight to things, and if it stumbled on no contradic

tions among its conceptions it would probably never suspect

the existence and complexity of its own processes.

In estimating, then, a philosophical system, we must get

its position on these fundamental points of knowing and

being. All else, so far as it is logical, results from that po

sition. If we have a knowledge of the typical theories, we

may spare ourselves the trouble of reading new works be

yond the point necessary to determine their fundamental

position. For instance, if one has mastered the logic of sen

sationalism in Hume, there is no need to waste time on the

pathetic efforts of later sensationalists to galvanize their

dead philosophy into some semblance of life.

Philosophy aims at a rational comprehension of reality.

But the instrument of philosophy is thought itself. All sys

tems of whatever kind, even systems of doubt and denial,

must recognize the existence of laws of thought whereby

the normal processes and results of thinking are distin

guished from the abnormal. Without such recognition

there is no distinction between rational and irrational, and

naught remains but caprice, obstinacy, and infatuation.

Hence the logical order of philosophical study is logic,

epistemology, and metaphysics. The first treats of the laws

of normal thinking, or the science of thought. The second

applies these laws to the problem of knowledge, and, by

analyzing the idea of knowledge, aims to discover its gen

eral conditions and implications. These two are only dif

ferent aspects of the one question. The third asks after the

final conceptions reached by thought concerning real exist

ence, or, more specifically, concerning man, nature, and the

fundamental reality.

We have, then, as the most significant divisions of phil

osophic study the following :

1. Logic, or the Theory of Thought ;

2. Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge ;

3. Metaphysics, or the Theory of Being.

The first two divisions will be discussed in the pres

ent volume. The third will be postponed to a second vol

ume.

The first topic, then, is logic, or the theory of thought.

The treatment will differ somewhat from that of the tra

ditional formal logic, because thought itself is differently

conceived. We agree with the traditional logician that

logic cannot deal with particular and concrete objects of

knowledge, but should confine itself to the general forms

and principles of thought which apply to all objects. At

the same time, however, we conceive that thought has many

forms besides those of the notion, the judgment, and the

inference. The entire system of categories belongs to the

forms of thought, and must be treated in any adequate ex

position. Furthermore, unless logic is to sink into a barren

shuffling of artificial notions, without any significance for

truth or knowledge, it must take some account of its own

metaphysical presuppositions.

A detailed and exhaustive discussion is not aimed at in

the present work. The plan is rather to select such funda

mental points for discussion as shall give the reader some

idea of the essential nature of thought, and of the essential

factors of the thought process. An insight into principles

often dispenses with the discussion of details ; and the study

of details without a knowledge of principles can come to

no conclusion beyond barren reflections and desultory obser

vations.

CHAPTER I

THE GENEEAL NATUEE OF THOUGHT

TIIEEE is no fixed definition of logic. Accordingly, its

field is extended all the way from formal reasoning to met

aphysics, according to the pleasure of the speculator. Even

those who agree in defining it as the science of thought do

not agree as to the limits of thought, and thus the differ

ence reappears. This is due to the organic nature of rea

son, which forbids any hard and fast divisions. Hence, in

stead of engaging in barren disputes concerning the exact

limits of logic, it is better to recognize that those limits

must always have something arbitrary in them, and to aim

at consistency, relevance, and significance in our specula

tions, whatever we call them.

We define logic as the science of thought, and proceed

to show what we mean by thought. Of course, our im

mediate concern is with our human thinking. "Whether

" Thought," or " Consciousness," or " Cosmic Thought " be

a presupposition of our thinking must be postponed to the

Theory of Knowledge. Meanwhile, we limit our attention

to our human thinking.

This limitation must be carefully noted, as oversight

thereof has been a fruitful source of verbal disputes. It is

plain that many things may be true for cosmic thought

which are not true for our human thinking; and many

limitations may be affirmed of the latter which must be denied of the former. The confusion of the two points of

view can only result in further confusion.

For the present, then, we occupy the human standpoint ;

and our first work must be to gain some idea of what our

human thought is.

The life of consciousness, as occurring, is neither true nor

false, but simply fact. Misconceptions are as much facts as

correct conceptions, and arise equally in accordance with

mental laws. But this life has another aspect, according to

which it is not merely a mental event, but an apprehension

of truth. In this respect it is also subject to laws which

claim to be the laws of normal thinking and the conditions

of reaching truth. The mental life, considered as fact, be

longs to psychology ; the mental life, considered as appre

hending truth, belongs to logic. This form of activity we

call thought.

Thought, then, is that form of mental activity whose aim.

is truth or knowledge. The nature, laws, and implications

of this activity a re the subject of our study.

For the better understanding of this definition, it should

be remembered that the term thought is often used with

two entirely distinct meanings. Thought may signify the

mental activity, and it may signify the contents grasped

through that activity. In the latter sense, of course,

thought includes everything which can exist for us. Sen

sations, feelings, the whole universe, indeed, so far as it

is known, belong to thought. From this point of view,

thought has no antithesis, but is all-inclusive. Oversight of

this ambiguity has been the source of not a little sterile and

tedious logomachy, something like that resulting from con

founding thought and " Thought."

We have defined thought from the subjective standpoint

as that form, of mental activity whose aim is truth or

knowledge. The reality and peculiarity of thought as a

special form of activity will further appear if we contrast

it with the affections of sense.

The human mind never rests in impressions of the sensi

bility, but works them over into forms inherent in its own

nature. In so doing it transcends the sense fact entirely,

and it does this on its own warrant. Thus, suppose I am

struck by a stone. The sense fact is simply certain visual,

tactual, and painful sensations. If I say the stone hit me,

I have transcended the sense experience, and attributed ob

jective existence and causal efficiency to the stone. Sub

tract these ideas, and there is nothing left but a succession

of sensations in my own consciousness.

Again, if I suppose I see a moving body, the sense fact

is only a continuous set of visual appearances at adjacent

points of space in successive moments of time. To trans

form this into a moving body, I must pass from the fact of

sense to the notion of an objective and identical thing. Or

if I suppose I have successive experiences of the same thing,

the sense fact is merely a similarity of successive sensa

tions ; and I should never get beyond this, unless I inter

preted the sense fact by the notion of an abiding and iden

tical thing.

Thus in these simplest and most elementary experiences

we find a peculiar mental activity manifesting itself. There

is a surplusage over the sensations. Here are ideas which

are not sensations, nor any possible modifications of sensa

tion. They do not admit of being sensuously presented,

but belong to the unpicturable notions of intelligence. Yet

the sensations become an intelligible object for us only as

these ideas are superinduced upon them by the action of

the understanding. This surplusage in experience beyond

the contribution of the senses was recognized by Hume,

and attributed to a mental "propensity to feign."

There is, then, a great distinction between what is in

sense and what is in thought. Of course, we at first sup

pose that all those things are in sense which we perceive

through sense ; but a small amount of reflection serves to

dispel this illusion. In dealing with paintings and draw

ings, or with printed and written matter, the eye gives only

lines and colors ; the mind adds the meaning. But there

can be no doubt that in all visual perception the meaning is

contributed by the mind in like manner. What the eye

gives is one thing ; what we see or perceive is quite another.

Since the publication of Berkeley s New Theory of Vision

this fact has been a commonplace of psychology.

In hearing and the other senses the distinction is equally

manifest. When we come to scientific study, the distinction

between what is in sense and what is in thought is apparent

even to the dullest. Even the sciences which have to do

with physical objects live and move and have their being

mainly in a world of rational conceptions which can be en

tered only by thought. Very fe\v scientific conceptions

admit of being sensuously presented or sensuously verified.

Thus, along with the receptivity of sense, but distinct from

it, we see a special order of mental activity which works

over sense data into rational forms. From this point of

view, thought might be defined as the process whereby the

mind works over the raw material of the sensibility into the

forms of intelligence. This would not be a complete defini

tion, but it would call attention to one of the most impor

tant aspects and functions of the thought activity in our ex

perience.

Once more we may illustrate the reality and peculiarity

of the thought movement by contrasting it with the associ-

ational movement.

We find two orders of movement and combination in con

sciousness. Man}?- things or events are found together or

occur together in experience without any inner connection.

But when they have thus come together in experience they

tend thereafter to recur together by virtue of the laws of

association. The most unlike things which have occurred

together tend to recur together ; and sometimes the connec

tion becomes so intimate as to seem a matter of course.

Language furnishes a good example. The words, spoken or

written, have absolutely no likeness to the thought, and no

fitness to express just that thought rather than any other ;

yet when once joined they seem to belong together, so that

we even fancy we see or hear the thought itself. This fact

underlies the order of reproduction. Memory reproduces

the order of occurrence in accordance with the laws of asso

ciation. This is the first order of movement. It is a me

chanical grouping and reproduction of elements which have

come together, and implies no internal connection.

The second order is of a different kind. It aims to

reach not accidental conjunction, but rational connection.

The distinction between the two is that in the former case

the elements only come together, whereas in the latter

they belong together. Thus, sound and idea come together ;

but the properties of a triangle, or cause and effect, belong

together. The former might conceivably be separated ; the

latter are fixed in changeless relations. Now, the second

order of mental movement referred to aims to transform

the occurrences and accidental conjunctions of experience

into rational connections, so that our thought shall repre

sent not merely the chance order of coming together, but

the fixed order of belonging together. The associational

order repeats indifferently the conjunctions of experience ;

the thought order subjects them to a rational ideal.

This antithesis between thought and sensation, or be

tween the thought movement and the associational move

ment, has not always been allowed. Thus, Hume recognized

only conjunction and denied connection. In this he has

generally been followed by the sensationalists. They have

sought by means of association working upon sensations

to evolve thought itself ; so that finally all that is native

to the mind is the passive sensibility and the laws of as

sociation. Given these, they aim to exhibit all else as

product.

In so far as this claim admits the present existence of

laws of thought, it is irrelevant to our present purpose. It

is an attempt not to deny those laws, but to explain them

on a psychological basis. The laws are evolved but valid.

The thought life roots, indeed, in the sense life, but has its

special forms nevertheless. In so far as the associational

claim contains a denial of the laws of thought, we shall

consider it in connection with particular cases. We shall

see hereafter that, if the antithesis of thought and sensation

is to be denied, it must be from the side of thought rather

than from that of sensation. It may turn out that sensa

tion itself is in a very important sense a thought product.

We come now to a point of the highest importance in

studying the nature of thought. Eeference has already

been made to it in speaking of thought as related to truth.

Some amplification is in order here.

Thought may be viewed as a mental event which ends

in itself, and it may be viewed as apprehending or report

ing a truth or reality beyond the mental event. Many of

our conscious experiences are only mental events. They

report nothing, and their whole duty is simply to be what

they are. As such they are simply accidents of the indi

vidual, and have no relation to truth. As Ferrier has it, they

represent or apprehend nothing which is "common to all";

they are simply an experience which is "special to me."

But the distinguishing mark of thought is that, in addi

tion to being a mental event, it claims to represent a truth

which is independent of the mental event. Of course,

thinking, as a process, is particular ; and the entire contents

of consciousness as mental events are particular; but our

thoughts, though mental events, claim to be valid for an

order of fact or reason which our thoughts do not make

but discover, and which is common to all and not merely

special to me.

But there are some mental events which are only special

to me, as feelings, moods, and all mental states which end in

themselves ; yet in dealing with these the same fact comes

out. For while these mental events are special to me in

their occurrence, thought treats them as actual happenings

in the total system of reality, and thus constitutes them

a possible object of knowledge for all, and fixes them as

actual components of the total reality.

How thought can do this, how the particular thought

which, as mental event, is special to me can nevertheless

affirm and apprehend something valid for all is no doubt

a great mystery ; but the fact is so involved in the nature

of thought that thought vanishes altogether with its denial.

It is this fact which constitutes the universality and

objectivity of thought, and distinguishes the judgment at

least, in its intention from a subjective union of ideas.

Of course, this does not hinder that thought may often

be mistaken. Chance conjunctions are put forward as fixed

connections. Accidents of the individual are assumed to

have universal validity. The special to me is mistaken for

the common to all. But this very fact only illustrates once

more that universality, or objective validity, is the essen

tial form of thought.

This conclusion finds further support in a consideration

of the judgment. What does any judgment mean? It

always involves the assumption of objective validity, and

would be absurd or frivolous without it.

Thus, suppose, for instance, that a geometrical judgment

is in question say, the sum of the angles of a triangle is

equal to two right angles. Xo one would admit that by

this judgment he meant only that in his own consciousness

the subject and predicate come together. Possibly, under

polemical stress, a sensational philosopher might momen

tarily take such a position ; and then the sufficient answer

would be, Well, what of it ? The judgment being by hy

pothesis an accident of the individual, no one else need con

cern himself about it. But the bare fact of living together

and of being mutually intelligible makes such a position

impossible except as a verbal pretence. The geometrical

judgment, then, carries with it a reference to a fixed order

of reason which is common to all, and assumes to set forth

some truth concerning that order.

Or we may take a judgment in physics say, that water

rises thirty-three feet in a pump under a certain barometric

pressure. However many mental events may occur in

reaching and announcing this judgment, no one would have

the courage to say that it means only that certain notions

cohere in his own consciousness. Even the most determined

sensationalist or idealist would have to admit a world of

coexistent minds and a universal order according to which

all particular consciousness is determined. Without this

admission the unlucky speculator would fall a prey to

solipsism. Thus, the physical judgment contains a neces

sary reference to an order of fact which is not an accident

of the individual, but is common to all. The nature of this

common fact may remain highly mysterious, but its exist

ence cannot be questioned without absurdity.

If, finally, we take an historical judgment say, Washing

ton crossed the Delaware we see the same objective impli

cation. Here an order of historical fact is assumed; and

however necessary our thoughts as mental events may be

for the grasping of the fact, they can never be identified

with the fact.

Thus, in the essential nature and intention of the judg

ment, we see thought transcending itself as mental event,

and positing a system for which our thought is valid, but

which it does not make. The universality and community

of the object have at bottom this meaning ; not that every

one grasps it, but that the apprehending thought repro

duces an order which is independent of itself. If it should

occur to some one of idealistic tendencies to suggest that

this objective system is itself only a thought, the answer

would be that, if it were so, it could not be identified with

the thought of the finite individual, but would be indepen

dent of any and all of our thinking. For us, then, it would

be something which we do not make but find. If, finally,

any one should insist that thought cannot recognize any

thing beyond itself, that might well be true for " Thought,"

but it is not true for our thinking. For, whether philoso

phy can make anything of it or not, we are constantly

recognizing an order of fact which we cannot view as de

pendent on our thinking, or as vanishing when we go to

sleep.

This objective reference of thought is especially to be

dwelt upon, as it is commonly overlooked by sensational

ism and various cheap idealisms. They assume that im

pressions are the raw material of knowledge, and that all

that has to be done is to group the impressions. But they

fail to make clear to themselves either the problem or the

data of their own theory. Now, in strictness, the data are

particular, unqualified impressions ; that is, they are im

pressions of nobody by nothing. If we relax the strictness

enough to allow the passive subject, then we have particu

lar impressions in the consciousness of a particular individ

ual ; and these admit of being variously associated. Then

the problem is out of these data to generate the subjective

form of knowledge and its objective validity.

The insolubility of this problem is manifest as soon as

we comprehend what is to be done. If we succeeded in

generating the subjective form of thought from particular

impressions, we should still have made no provision for the

objective reference and objective validity. For associated

impressions, after all, are only impressions associated, and

remain accidents of the individual after association has

done its best or worst. A solipsistic group of impressions

is the only outcome ; and the judgment sinks into a men

tal event which reports nothing. We are freed from these

whimsies by remembering the objective reference implicit

in thought from the beginning.

But this affirmation of an objective reference in thought

must not be mistaken for the claim that all parts of the

thought process have their double in reality. Thought, the

product, is objectively valid ; thought, the process, is no

part of the object. Hence a double inquiry. This con

cerns, first, the nature and laws of the thought process

considered as a form of mental activity; and, secondly,

the nature and extent of the validity of our thought for

the independent object. In the latter part of the inquiry,

logic passes into epistemology. Our immediate concern

is with the thought process, its conditions and laws.

The thought movement, when it becomes self-conscious

and reflective, rises into freedom, in distinction from the me

chanical movement of association. The thought life is rooted

in our nature, and begins without our reflective volition.

But this spontaneous thought remains on the surface of

things, and needs to be rendered more profound and exact.

This is the work of freedom. All earnest study, all science

and philosophy, rest upon a will to know, and a direction of

our powers to this end. Science and all the higher forms

of knowledge are no mechanical product, but a free achieve

ment of the truth-loving mind. Nature presents us with a

few things in the mental life ; but only free work and devo

tion can make us rulers over many.

Thus, we have sought to show that within our experience

there is a special order of mental* activity with law^s and aims

of its own, which is to be distinguished from the mechanical

order of association and from the passiveness of mere impres

sibility. If in our further study we find reason for doubting

this conclusion we promise to withdraw it. Pending such

discovery, we pass to consider the general logical conditions

of thought.

thank you

with love and a holy kiss blowing your way Roy